Promoting International Environmental Protections through Foreign Debt Exchange Transactions by Barrans, David
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 24
Issue 1 Winter 1991 Article 4
Promoting International Environmental
Protections through Foreign Debt Exchange
Transactions
David Barrans
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barrans, David (1991) "Promoting International Environmental Protections through Foreign Debt Exchange Transactions," Cornell
International Law Journal: Vol. 24: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol24/iss1/4
Promoting International
Environmental Protections Through
Foreign Debt Exchange
Transactions
Introduction
Two of the most recent commodities to gain prominence in the interna-
tional market are foreign debt and the environment. In response to a
variety of economic and social incentives, these two nontraditional com-
modities have become the subject of bargain and sale in limited spheres.
The expanding menu of options in international trade has promoted a
marriage of convenience between two often adversarial interests
whereby sovereign debt obligations are exchanged for environmental
protections.
Many debtor nations, suffering from the effects of rapid inflation
and declining export revenues, increasingly are unable to pay their
external debts. Accordingly, many creditors have discounted or sold
their foreign debt holdings.' This situation has given rise to a growing
secondary market wherein independent investors purchase debt at a dis-
counted price and assume the role of creditor.2 These investors hold
the debt subject to the same risks of default as the original lender, yet on
1. See Chamberlin, Gruson & Weitchek, Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 415, 417-19 (1989).
Inflation and declining export revenues in turn are caused by a number of factors,
including the conditions of the international market and policies of the debtor
nation, developed nations, and lending banks. It is perhaps impossible to conclu-
sively isolate the causes of the debt crisis. See Griffith-Jones & Nichols, New Directions
In Debt Management, 19 CASE W. RES. INT'L LJ. 53, 56-57 (1987). In simple terms, the
debt crisis is the result of the failure of borrowing nations to achieve anticipated
economic growth through the use of foreign loan funds. Barth, Bradley &
Panayotacos, Understanding the International Debt Crisis, 19 CASE W. RES. INT'L L.J. 31,
32-35 (1987).
2. M. DEFARIA, D. SToTr & T. BUCHANAN, PW/EUROMONEY DEBT-EQurIY SWAP
GUIDE ch. 2 (1988). The average market price for the debt of the 15 most heavily
indebted countries decreased from 68 cents per dollar of debt in January 1987 to 36
cents per dollar in January 1989. New Approaches to the Third World Debt Problem: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1989). For tables of
secondary market prices of some foreign debts, see Foreign Operations, Export Financing
and Related Programs Appropriations for 1990: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 48, pt. 5 (1989) [hereinafter Foreign
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a lower cost basis. Upon purchasing the debt, investors sometimes
negotiate with the debtor nation to exchange the debt for other inter-
ests, such as equity interests in industries of the debtor nation.3
Independent of the debt crisis, the environment recently has
become a prominent issue in international trade and multilateral agree-
ments. Growing concern over issues such as global warming and extinc-
tion of plant and animal species has led nations to seek means of
restricting the environmentally destructive activities of other nations.4
In recent years, concern has focused largely on the world's rain forests,
which are crucially important to the global environment. 5
Although the preferred method of obtaining global environmental
protections is through negotiated treaties, 6 political problems arise
when the evil sought to be remedied is particular only to certain nations.
For example, destruction of the rain forests in Brazil adversely affects
the ozone layer worldwide, yet attempts to negotiate restrictions of com-
mercial activities in the rain forest impose a unilateral burden on Brazil
and are opposed as "environmental imperialism." 7 Thus, countries
seeking to impose unilateral burdens to protect the environment often
must "purchase" those protections through economic incentives.8 As
with foreign debt, environmental protections have become a commodity
bought and sold through international transactions.
The rise of these nontraditional commodities has led to several vari-
eties of innovative international transactions, the effectiveness of which
remains to be seen. Several recent transactions recognize the conver-
gence of these environmental and financial concerns by attempting to
simultaneously ease the burdens of repaying foreign debt and establish
Operations]; see also R. DEBS, D. ROBERTS & E. REMOLONA, FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FINANCE: DEBT SWAPS 21 (1987).
3. The original lender may itself negotiate such exchanges with the debtor
nation. Wallenstein & Silkenat, Investment Funds and Debt-Equity Swaps: Broadening the
Base of a New Financial Tool, 12 FORDHAM INT'L Lj. 9, 17 (1988). Investors who
purchase discounted debt, however, obtain a greater advantage through the use of
the secondary debt market. An investor may purchase a given amount of debt at a
price significantly below face value and exchange it for interests equivalent to the
face value of the exchanged debt.
4. Hoagland, Global Change is Key Political Topic for 1989, BIosCIENCE, Mar. 1989,
at 151.
5. See Giaimo, Deforestation in Brazil- Domestic Political Imperative-Global Ecological
Disaster, 18 ENvTL. L. REV. 537 (1988).
6. See Peddington, Sovereignty and the Environment, ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1989, at
18.
7. Rowen, Heading Offan Amazon Disaster, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1989, at HI, col. 2;
The World Puts the Heat on Brazil, WORLD PRESS REV., May 1989, at 38.
8. See Stavins, Harnessing Market Forces to Protect the Environment, ENVIRONMENT,
Jan./Feb. 1989, at 6.
One recent example of using economic incentives to protect the environment is
Article IV of the Montreal Protocol on Substances Which Deplete the Ozone Layer,
26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987), by which nations signing the treaty agree to restrict trade with
countries producing chlorofluourocarbons in excess of levels established by the
treaty. Such restricted trade amounts to a trade embargo on countries who do not
comply with the standards of the Protocol. Id. at 1554.
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mechanisms to protect the global environment. Among the most prom-
ising of such transactions is the "debt-for-nature swap." 9
Debt-for-nature swaps are a method of restructuring existing debt
whereby a creditor bank sells or donates part of the outstanding debt to
a charitable organization. Pursuant to an agreement between the chari-
table organization and the debtor nation, the debtor nation pays the face
amount of the debt to its own national environmental programs. 10 This
arrangement eases the burden of capital flight by allowing the debt pay-
ments to remain in the debtor nation, reducing the debt obligation with-
out reducing its capital base.I t Simultaneously, it provides funds for
environmental protection programs that benefit the debtor nation and
the global environment.
The environmental protections negotiated through debt-for-nature
swaps fall into at least two basic categories. First, debtor nations may
agree to establish conservation reserves where environmentally destruc-
tive activities are prohibited or restricted. Alternatively, exchanged debt
amounts may fund new or existing environmental protection programs
such as reforestation, park maintenance, environmental research, and
education and training. Some debt exchanges combine both forms of
protections. Exchanges of the latter type are sometimes called "debt-
for-development swaps." Debt-for-development swaps are transactions
in which converted debt finances programs to improve the general social
welfare in developing countries. Such programs may promote educa-
tion, famine relief, technological advances, or environmental protec-
tions. This Note will collectively refer to both types of transactions as
"debt-for-nature swaps." When referring specifically to one or the
other, transactions establishing specific reserve areas will be called
"debt-for-conservation swaps," and those funding other types of pro-
grams will be called "debt-for-development swaps." 1 2
9. See Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 1, at 440-46.
10. See Conservation Groups Help Bail Out the Big Banks, Bus. & Soc'Y REV., Spring
1988, at 34 [hereinafter Conservation Groups Help].
11. Capital flight, the net outflow of capital from developing nations to developed
nations, has more than quadrupled since 1984 due to decreased investment in
indebted nations and the severe trade imbalance resulting from the debt crisis.
Approximately 70% of all new loan funds to the largest Latin American debtors is
repaid to developed countries as interest on debt. S. GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN
DEBT 20 (1988). In 1988, $43 billion was transferred from developing countries to
developed ones. MacNeil, Strategies for Sustainable Economic Development, Sci. AM., Sept.
1989, at 156. See generally S. GEORGE, supra, at 19-21; C. CARVOUNIS, THE FOREIGN
DEBT/NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONFLICT 134-37 (1986) (detailing the effects of the
debt crisis on capital flight).
12. These distinctions may be more theoretical than practical. Conservation and
management of natural resources are factors contributing to development. Thus
most debt-for-nature swaps can be said to serve developmental ends. From another
perspective, however, conservation directly inhibits development. For purposes of
this Note, the distinction between debt-for-conservation and debt-for-development
swaps refers more specifically to the scope of the exchange. Debt-for-conservation
swaps seek environmental concessions for global benefits. Debt-for-development
swaps seek to implement social programs promoting economic and social develop-
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This Note will examine the operation of debt-for-nature swaps and
related transactions and their potential effectiveness in achieving the
dual ends of easing the debt burden and protecting the environment.
This Note concludes that existing forms of environmentally-oriented
debt exchanges may offer limited benefits; however, many debtor
nations are reluctant to participate in such exchanges. Part One of this
Note will discuss the need - in the entire global environment - for
mechanisms to protect the rain forests. Part Two will review the rela-
tionship of environmental concerns to the debt crisis. Part Three will
examine the operation of debt-for-nature swaps, using specific recent
examples. Part Four will explore various methods for potentially
increasing the effectiveness of these transactions. Finally, Part Five will
examine the role that the United States and the World Bank must play in
facilitating debt exchanges.
I. The Environmental Imperative
Environmental damage is a consequence of development traditionally
regarded as a necessary evil for which economic prosperity will compen-
sate.' 3 Yet, the increasingly rapid degradation of the world environ-
ment has forced a new perspective, one which recognizes a current
environmental crisis of global proportions. 14 This section details the
effects of the destruction of tropical rain forests upon the earth's envi-
ronment and the urgent need for rain forest protection.
Rain forests are the most important natural entity for maintaining
biological diversity and preventing global warming. The effects of
deforestation are potentially devastating.' 5 Rain forests are the earth's
primary reservoir of biological diversity. While covering only seven per-
cent of the earth's surface, they house between fifty to sixty percent of
all plant and animal species, the majority of which have yet to be discov-
ered. 16 Scientists estimate that if current deforestation is not stopped,
approximately fifteen to twenty percent of the world's plant and animal
species will be extinct by the year 2000.17 Already, approximately 100
ment in the debtor nation. In practice, most debt-for-nature swaps involve a combi-
nation of the two objectives.
13. See Rich, Funding Deforestations: Conservation Woes at the World Bank, NAnON,
Jan. 23, 1989, at 90.
14. Hoagland, supra note 4, at 151.
15. Tropical Forests: An Endangered Species, WORLD PRESS REV., May 1989, at 36
[hereinafter Tropical Forests).
16. Linden, The Death of Birth, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 33. Approximately 1.7 of an
estimated 5 to 30 million species are currently cataloged. Id.
17. Goodland & Ledec, Wildlands: Balancing Conversion With Conservation in World
Bank Projects, ENVIRONMENT, Nov. 1989, at 6.
The opportunity costs of mass extinctions are incalculable. Not only will the evolu-
tionary process be permanently altered, but the destruction of species will greatly
hinder development of drugs for prevention and treatment of disease. One fourth of
all drugs prescribed in the U.S. come from tropical plants. Linden, supra note 16, at
33. Deforestation may have already destroyed plants that would have been invalua-
ble in the treatment of AIDS, cancer, and other diseases.
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plant and animal species are being driven to extinction each day.
18
Approximately 77,000 square miles of tropical rain forests are
destroyed each year, 30,000 in South America alone.' 9 At present rates
of deforestation, half of all rain forest land existing in 1980 could be
wiped out by the year 2000.20 Moreover, as rain forests become smaller,
they may cease to be self-sustaining and die off.
2 1
The effects of deforestation upon global warming may already be
discernible. Rain forests absorb a substantial amount of atmospheric
carbon dioxide and thereby help maintain a relatively stable balance of
atmospheric gases. 22 It is theorized that excess carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere traps heat near the earth's surface, increasing surface tem-
peratures. 23 Moreover, when trees are burned, or cut and left to rot,
they release additional carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.24 Accord-
ing to computer projections, the accumulation of atmospheric carbon
dioxide resulting from current deforestation practices could raise the
earth's average temperature between three and nine degrees Fahrenheit
by the year 2050.25 This increase would cause oceans to rise by several
feet, flooding coastal areas and ruining vast tracts of farmland through
salinization.26 It would also affect weather patterns, creating dramatic
changes in the climate and altering vegetation types in much of the
world.2 7 The United Nations Development Program recently stated
that only the devastation of a nuclear war could equal the global effects
18. Sancton, What on Earth Are We Doing?, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 24. Scientists
estimate that at least 12%6 of bird species in the Amazon, and 15% of plants in Cen-
tral and South America can be counted among the "living dead," having little chance
for continued survival. Linden, supra note 16, at 34.
19. Tropical Forests, supra note 15, at 36.
20. Goodland & Ledec, supra note 17, at 6.
21. Linden, supra note 16, at 32. Thomas Lovejoy, former Vice President of Sci-
ence of the World Wildlife Federation, set up a 20 year experiment in 1979 to deter-
mine how large a forest must be to sustain itself. So far he has concluded that the
smaller a forest is, the faster the decline of insect, bird, and mammal species. Id.
22. Sancton, supra note 18, at 26; Tropical Forests, supra note 15, at 36.
23. This phenomenon is commonly known as the "greenhouse effect." Carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases are relatively transparent to the visible and near-
infrared wavelengths that carry most of the heat energy of sunlight, but they absorb
the longer infrared wavelengths emitted by the earth more efficiently than other
gases. Thus, excesses of atmospheric carbon dioxide allow more heat from the sun
to reach the earth, while inhibiting the escape of heat radiated from the earth's sur-
face. Schneider, The Greenhouse Effect: Science and Policy, SCIENcE, Feb. 10, 1989, at
772, reprinted in Foreign Operations, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 206-07.
24. Id.
25. Sancton, supra note 18, at 28. Some scientists, however, claim that the build-
up of atmospheric carbon dioxide will not cause global warming or that natural
processes will mitigate the effects. Id.
26. Id.
27. Foreign Operations, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 46-50 (testimony of H.H. Shugart,
Professor of Environmental Sciences, University of Virginia). Professor Shugart esti-
mates that under current models which predict a doubling of atmospheric carbon
dioxide levels, about 35% of the terrestrial surface might be climatically shifted from
one vegetation type to another. Id. at 47.
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of the destruction of the rain forests.28
Against this apocalyptic scenario, a global environmental conscious-
ness has arisen, focused largely on the Central and South American
countries that house the tropical rain forests. Protecting the rain forests
is now a virtual necessity, and where satisfactory protections cannot be
imposed, they must be purchased. The rise of a market for discounted
debt owed by many of the tropical countries has provided convenient
capital for the purchase.
II. The Relationship of the Environmental Crisis to the Debt Crisis
This section examines the relationship of economic and environmental
problems in developing countries. This relationship has two important
components. First, the debt crisis leads developing countries to exploit
their natural resources through environmentally destructive commercial
activities. Second, those destructive activities inhibit long-term eco-
nomic development.
A. Mutual Causality
Both the ascendence of developing country debt and of the environment
as international market commodities are not wholly independent phe-
nomena. Many of the externally funded developmental projects which
contributed to the accrual of current debts also contributed to the cur-
rent environmental crisis. 29 Furthermore, the developing countries'
burden of trying to repay their external debt has also caused, or at least
exacerbated, many of the most compelling environmental problems,
most notably rapid deforestation. 30
The severity of the debt crisis forces lesser developed countries
(LDCs) to halt many developmental activities, as well as environmental
programs, and instead search for "quick fix" solutions which generate
maximum revenues quickly. In Brazil, for example, quick fix solutions
28. Tropical Forests, supra note 15, at 36.
29. See Plater, Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental Diseconomies, and Interna-
tional Reform Pressures on the Lending Process: The Example of Third World Dam-Building
Projects, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 169 (1989); S. GEORGE, supra note 11, at 155-68
(detailing the "ecocide" resulting from several World Bank-funded projects); Foreign
Operations, supra note 2, pt. 6, at 534-72 (statement of Bruce M. Rich on behalf of the
Environmental Defense Fund and National Wildlife Federation).
Three of the World Bank's projects in Brazil-the Polonoroeste Project, the
Carajas Iron Ore Mine and Railroad Project, and the Power Sector Loans-currently
involve more than $1.5 billion in loans to Brazil, as well as massive deforestation in
the Amazon. The Carajas Project alone will likely deforest an area of about 58,000
square miles within 20 years. Id. at 555, 538.
30. S. GEORGE, supra note 11, at 155-68.
Conversely, the destruction of the environment often serves to cut short the useful
life of the very projects which caused the destruction. For example, erosion and sedi-
mentation caused by deforestation inhibit water flow to hydroelectric dams built in
the rain forest, sometimes cutting their useful life in half and reducing their produc-
tivity by as much as 80%. Id. at 163-64; Reid, Sustainable Development: Lessons From
Success, ENVIRONMENT, May 1989, at 8.
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include clear-cutting of the rain forests, which accommodates the use of
cut trees for timber export and domestic fuel consumption, and the use
of the land for farming and cattle ranching.3 1
The quick fix solutions not only contribute to long-term degrada-
tion of the global environment but also inhibit long-term economic
development by exhausting the debtor nation's natural resources.
Tropical forestland converted to agricultural and livestock uses loses its
productivity in one to three years, leaving the lands depleted and use-
less.3 2 Nevertheless, indebted nations continue to provide generous tax
and credit incentives for such uses because they need the immediate rev-
enues those uses produce.3 3 Productive uses of rain forest land which
do not destroy the forest, such as rubber tree tapping and "extractive"
farming, produce less immediate revenues than quick fix solutions but
are more profitable in the long run since they are renewable.3 4 Over a
ten year period, the net present value of the land favors conversion to
agricultural and ranch use, but for any period beyond ten years, the land
is more valuable for extractive use.3 5
The current debt burden forces many nations into shortsighted rev-
enue maximization. Debtor nations in effect mortgage their economic
future and the future of the global environment in an attempt to meet
current debt obligations. While a number of other factors have contrib-
uted to both problems, the debt crisis serves to exacerbate environmen-
tal problems, and the destruction of the environment often exacerbates
the debt crisis by depleting usable natural resources. Thus, a complete
remedy for developing nations must address both debt relief and envi-
ronmental protection.
B. Mutual Solutions
In Third World countries the problem of debt relief is symptomatic
of a more rudimentary problem - how to foster sustainable long-term
development.3 6 Like the problem of debt relief, the cause of the devel-
31. Hultkrans, Greenbacks for Greenery, SIERRA, Nov./Dec. 1988, at 43; Hecht &
Cockburn, Defenders of the Amazon, NATION, May 22, 1989, at 695.
32. Reid, supra note 30, at 8.
33. Government Policies Promote Deforestation, BIOsCIENCE, Sept. 1988, at 540; Hult-
krans, supra note 31, at 43.
In some cases, these credits encourage inefficient economic activities. In the Phil-
ippines, for example, inefficient wood processing plants subsidized by the govern-
ment lost $500 million in potential revenues between 1979 and 1982. Government
Policies Promote Deforestation, supra, at 540. In parts of Brazil, unprofitable ranches are
kept in operation only because of large government subsidies. Reid, supra note 30, at
9.
34. Reid, supra note 30, at 33.
35. Id.
36. For a discussion of the global benefits of environmental protection, see supra
notes 15-28 and corresponding text.
The economic benefits of development in foreign countries come in at least two
forms. First, economic development enables developing nations to repay their debts
to creditors in developed nations. Second, economic recovery in developing nations
will increase the demand for export products from industrialized nations. The
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opment problem can be linked with the lack of environmental protec-
tion. 37 Recognizing the mutual causality of these problems is the crucial
first step in finding a long-term solution to either. Historically, mutual
causality has rarely been recognized. Indeed, few programs have simul-
taneously addressed both environmental and economic problems.
The limited and divergent perspectives of environmentalists and
economic planners have resulted in few mutual solutions. Foreign credi-
tors, as well as developing country borrowers, traditionally do not take
into account the environmental benefits of rain forest conservation in
the cost-benefit calculus precedent to project loans and debt relief pro-
grams. 38 While economic and environmental concerns are not always
viewed as antagonistic, bankers seldom view them as co-dependent.
Environmentalists traditionally have taken an absolutist stance. Indus-
trialization tends to polarize economic and environmental concerns,
resulting in a perception that conservation must be achieved through
environmental protectionism rather than through accommodation of
commercial activity.3 9 Furthermore, environmentalists generally lack
economic or political power to influence financial and developmental
policies of commercial banks and debtor nations.40
mounting developing country debt burden in the 1980s has drastically reduced con-
sumption of U.S. imports in those countries, resulting in unemployment and an
increased trade imbalance in the U.S. In 1983, U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce
Lionel Olmer estimated that the decline in Mexican imports alone from 1981 to 1982
may have resulted in the loss of as many as 250,000 jobs in the U.S. V. AGGARWAL,
INTERNATIONAL DEBT THREAT: BARGAINING AMONG CREDITORS AND DEBTORS IN THE
1980s 36 (1987).
U.S. exports to Latin America decreased by approximately $11 billion between
1981 and 1986. Banking Committee Provisions of the Trade Bill, Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on International Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 201 (1988) (statement of Jeffrey Sachs,
Harvard University). See generally Impact of the Latin American Debt Crisis on the U.S.,
Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Debt of the Senate Comm. on Finance., 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) (testimony regarding economic consequences of the Latin
American debt crisis in the U.S.).
37. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
38. For example, the World Bank's charter provides that in the deliberations of
the Bank and its officers, "Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their
decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve
the purposes stated in Article 1 [instructing the bank to make loans for productive
development]." ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECON-
STRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENt art. IV, § 10 (1945).
39. See Muldoon, The International Law of Ecodevelopment: Emerging Norms for Develop-
ment Assistance Agencies 22 TEx. INT'L LJ. 1, 9 (1986).
40. Several recent U.S. statutes attempt to give private organizations, including
environmental groups, greater ability to influence the lending practices of the U.S.
and the World Bank. The "Grassroots Collaboration Program," established by stat-
ute in 1987, encourages participation of nongovernmental organizations in the
design, implementation, and monitoring of World Bank-funded projects. 22 U.S.C.
§ 262p-1 (1987). Another statute instructs the U.S. President to place a high priority
on promoting rain forest protection through foreign aid. The statute specifically
instructs the President, whenever feasible, to accomplish that objective "through
projects managed by private and voluntary organizations or international, regional,
or national nongovernmental organizations .... " 22 U.S.C. § 2151p-l(d) (1986).
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International financial institutions, including the World Bank and
the regional development banks,4 1 have recently made efforts to consol-
idate environmental and economic concerns in their lending policies.4 2
The World Bank and the regional development banks have increased
the environmental review of projects which they fund and condition
their loans upon compliance with environmental protection standards.4 3
The World Bank intends to substantially increase lending for specific
environmental projects, including reforestation.4 4 Although the envi-
ronmental returns of these policies thus far have been minimal,45 the
reforms they promise are significant in recognizing the need for and via-
bility of mutual solutions to environmental and economic problems.
The World Bank and regional development banks are charged with
promoting development in Third World nations, so recognition of the
mutuality of environmental and economic concerns mandates account-
ing for environmental impacts.4 6 Commercial lenders, however, have
no such obligations to environmental concerns. Although development
in foreign nations is in their best interests, the interests of commercial
banks are generally limited to seeking return on their immediate invest-
ments, with little regard for broader developmental policy.4 7 Moreover,
commercial banks provide most of the lending in developing nations,4 8
so economic activity in these nations is largely unconstrained by the
environmental conditions on World Bank loans.
41. The regional development banks are the Inter-American Development Bank,
the African Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. Foreign Operations,
supra note 2, pt. 4, at 238.
42. Id. at 238-69.
43. Id. at 244; Holden, The Greening of the World Bank, SCIENCE, June 17, 1988, at
1610.
44. Foreign Operations, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 255; Grieves, Poverty as Pollution,
FORBES, Nov. 14, 1988, at 204.
45. See Foreign Operations, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 237; and sources cited infra note
148.
46. The World Bank was established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 to
help fund reconstruction in Europe after World War II. Today, the Bank's primary
function is to finance investments for development in its member nations. ARTICLES
OF AGREEMENT, supra note 38, art. I; Gold, The Relationship Between the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 504 (1982). Since the
late 1960s, countries have gradually come to realize that environmental protection is
a necessary component of development. Muldoon, supra note 39, at 9-21; Report of
the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). Thus the
Bank's developmental mandate requires a consideration of environmental
protection.
47. G. BIRD, COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING AND THIRD WORLD DEBT 22 (1989).
[Commercial banks] will undoubtedly see their principal responsibility as
being to their shareholders, and they are likely to take the view that these
interests are best served in an uncertain world environment by trying to max-
imize short-run private profits: it may be unreasonable to expect them to
assume the global role of maximizing world economic welfare.
Id.
48. More than two-thirds of the external debt of highly-indebted countries is
owed to commercial creditors. WORLD BANK, WoRa DEBT TABLES 1988/89, vol. I, at
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The majority of lenders have failed to perceive the need for mutual
solutions to environmental and economic problems, prompting environ-
mentalists to seek mechanisms by which they can interject environmen-
tal concerns into economic transactions. For the most part, mutual
solutions have not arisen from recognition of mutual causality, but
rather from a convenient alliance of bankers and environmentalists in
market transactions. Environmental organizations have seized upon the
growing secondary market for foreign debt as a means of negotiating
environmental protections in foreign countries.
m. Debt-for-Nature Swaps
A. The Setting
As rampant inflation raised the spectre of default on foreign loans, cred-
itors came to view some form of debt relief as a necessity.4 9 Banks and
corporations turned to the secondary debt market to create mutually
advantageous debt-exchange programs. Investors could purchase
deeply discounted debt and allow the foreign debtors to divert loan pay-
ments directly into commercial activity within the debtor nation. The
investors would then receive an equity interest in the commercial activ-
ity.50 These "debt-for-equity" swaps are intended to stimulate eco-
nomic growth through investment in the debtor nation, while providing
some return in the form of equity to the new creditor.5 1
Debt exchanges can be attractive from the perspectives of all inter-
ested parties. Parties seeking to invest in ventures within debtor nations
can increase the per-dollar value of their investment. By purchasing
debt at a discount and exchanging it for an equity interest equal to the
face amount of the debt, investors receive a significant benefit.5 2 While
the bank selling the loan takes a loss on the sale, it obtains the benefit of
decreasing its exposure to risks of default by debtor nations.53 The
bank is also able to deduct the loss realized on the sale. 54 The debtor
49. V. AGGARWAL, supra note 36, at 14.
50. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 1, at 418.
51. Debt equity swaps generally do not provide any benefits in the form of debt
reduction or forgiveness; they merely change the form of the obligation. By con-
verting some debt requiring immediate repayment into other liabilities in the form of
equity interests, developing nations may be better able to meet remaining immediate
obligations. Moreover, the increased financing for public and private economic
endeavors might attract other foreign investment. R. DEBS, D. ROBERTS & E.
REMOLONA, supra note 2, at 16.
52. Shubin & Gibby, The Promotion of Debt Equity Swaps in Latin America: A Survey of
the Regulatory Regimes and the International Policy Framework, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 31, 64 (1988). On the secondary market foreign debt has been discounted as
much as 80% below the original loan amount. See R. DEBS, D. ROBERTS & E.
REMOLONA, supra note 2, at 21.
53. The discounts set by the banks reflect, primarily, the prospects for loan repay-
ment, although they may also be affected by the degree to which creditors and debt-
ors are unable to agree upon specific rescheduling programs. R. DEBS, D. ROBERTS &
E. REMOLONA, supra note 2, at 20.
54. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205.
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nation will still have to repay the debt amount - usually to a corpora-
tion within its own borders - but the conversion of the form of the
obligation eliminates the accrual of interest payments. 5 5 In contrast,
under debt rescheduling plans, the debtor nation can defer repayment
of the principal amount almost indefinitely, but must keep interest pay-
ments current.5 6 The burden of paying the interest alone can seriously
inhibit development. 57 Furthermore, converting the debt obligation
into productive investment in the debtor nation will, ideally, promote
growth in that nation and attract further investments. The multiple ben-
efits of debt exchanges have attracted many investors, 58 leading to
numerous forms of such transactions. 59
B. The Structure
1. The Bolivian Debt-for-Nature Swap
The rise of debt-for-equity swaps in the mid-1980s paved the way for
debt-for-nature swaps. In July 1987, Conservation International (CI), a
U.S. environmental organization, arranged a debt-for-nature swap.
60
Pursuant to an agreement, 6 1 CI purchased $650,000 of Bolivia's com-
mercial debt from Citicorp for $100,000, or 15 cents per dollar of debt.
CI cancelled this debt in exchange for Bolivia's agreement to demarcate
3.7 million acres of tropical forest around the existing Beni Biosphere
Reserve as a protected area.6 2 Bolivia also established a $250,000 fund
in local currency to manage the biosphere reserve,63 and CI agreed to
assist in managing the area. The protected area was not set aside purely
for conservation uses, but rather to create a "buffer zone" around the
existing reserve. The agreement allows controlled commercial activities
in the buffer zone, subject to environmental regulations, including
55. Buchheit, Alternative Techniques in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 1988 U. ILL.
L.REV. 371, 374 (1988).
56. Id.
57. Brazil, for example, made payments of $4.7 billion in interest in 1987, com-
pared with $2.9 billion in repayment of principal. WORLD BANK, supra note 48, vol. II,
at 42.
58. In 1988, more than $40 billion in foreign debt was sold on the secondary
market. Id at vol. II, 1st Supp., at xiii. Not all of these sales led to debt exchanges.
In some cases, banks trade debt holdings with other creditors to decrease the amount
of their exposure in a particular country. Id. at vol. I, xxiii. Between 1984 and 1989,
debt exchanges reduced the debt of the 15 most heavily indebted nations by about
$20 billion, or roughly four percent of their external debt outstanding at the end of
1988. WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: A SURVEY By THE STAFF OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND 54 (Apr. 1989).
59. Alternative forms of commercial debt exchanges, known as debt for debt
swaps and debt for peso swaps, are discussed in R. DEBs, D. ROBERTS & E.
REMOLONA, supra note 2, 21-22, 24-25.
60. Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 24, 1987, at 15, col. 1; see also Hultkrans,
supra note 31, at 44.
61. Agreement Between the Government of Bolivia and Conservation International, reprinted
in part in 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L.J. 515 (1987/88) [hereinafter Bolivian Agreement].
62. Id.
63. Id.
Cornell International Law Journal
equivalent reforestation for each tree cut down in the project.64 Thus,
through a creative transaction, the CI program sought to reconcile com-
mercial development with conservation.
2. The Ecuadorian Debt-for-Nature Swap
In December 1987, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) arranged a larger
agreement with Ecuador under which WWF may purchase from U.S.
banks up to $10 million face value of Ecuador's debt at a market dis-
count.65 The full amount of the debt will then be converted by Ecua-
dor's central bank into local currency bonds, which will be held by
Fundacion Natura, an Ecuadorian conservation agency.6 6 The interest
on the bonds will be used to finance a variety of conservation projects
and, upon maturation, the principal amount will become an endowment
for Fundacion Natura. This swap contains both conservational and
developmental components. Some funds generated by this program
have established specifically protected areas. Other funds have been
used to maintain existing environmental protection and development
programs.6 7
3. Structural Variations
The Ecuadorian swap differs from the Bolivian swap in several respects.
First, rather than establishing specific new protected areas, funds in the
Ecuadorian swap are being used to finance existing conservation activi-
ties which may have been neglected in the country's attempt to raise
funds to meet its debt obligations. 68 While this arrangement lacks the
symbolic beauty of protecting an identifiable plot of rain forest land, it
has the advantage of vesting greater autonomy in existing agencies and
programs of the debtor nation, thus lessening the perception that for-
eign creditors are buying the rain forests - a perception that may be the
largest impediment to debt-for-nature swaps. 69
Secondly, by issuing bonds rather than cash, Ecuador reduced the
threat of inflation resulting from immediate conversion of debt into
local currency. 70 To convert debt into currency the debtor nation must
either divert funds from other programs - which is often infeasible or
improvident - or print new money, contributing to already staggering
inflation levels. 7 1 While issuing bonds may merely postpone the infla-
64. Collet, Bolivia Blazes Trail ... To Where? Conservation Measures Appear to have
Taken a Back Seat to Commercial Logging Interests, Christian Science Monitor, July 10,
1989, at 4, col. 1 (also indicates that companies in Bolivia have yet to plant a single
tree despite the reforestation requirement).
65. Conservation Groups Help, supra note 10, at 36.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 1, at 443.
69. Id. at 441 n.103.
70. Conservation Groups Help, supra note 10, at 36.
71. Petesch & Annis, Debt For Development Plan is No Gift for Third World, L.A.
Times, Dec. 9, 1987, § II, at 7, col. 1.
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tionary impact, the intervening period may offer valuable time in which
the debtor nation, with the aid of other debt-relief measures, can work
towards development and economic stabilization. To this end, debt-for-
nature swaps should be fully integrated with other debt relief strategies
to ensure that the effects of restructured and rescheduled debts do not
conflict with other obligations or compound inflation. Issuing bonds
rather than currency also provides better long-term funding of environ-
mental activities by providing annual interest payments and ultimately
an endowment. 72
Finally, the funds of the Ecuadorian swap are earmarked for purely
conservationist activities, while the Bolivian swap attempts to reconcile
commercial activities with conservation.7 3 Accordingly, the form of the
Bolivian swap is sometimes referred to as a debt-for-development swap
rather than a debt-for-nature swap. A debt-for-development swap seeks
to accommodate long-term social and economic development by any
number of means, including reduction of local poverty levels, improve-
ment of education and health standards, and protection of the
environment. 74
4. Individualized Solutions
The differing programs established in Bolivia and Ecuador do not neces-
sarily reflect the evolution of better debt exchange techniques, but
rather the need for specific solutions to individualized problems.
The debtor nation is primarily responsible for defining the struc-
ture of the swap. 75 Assent of the debtor nation to proposed debt-for-
72. Conservation Groups Help, supra note 10, at 36.
73. Conservation International intended to show to Bolivia that "conservation
can work in harmony with agriculture, forestry, fisheries and other economic devel-
opment projects." Collet, supra note 64, at 4. The Bolivian swap, however, has been
criticized as failing to meet this objective. Id.
74. The U.S. Director of the World Bank is statutorily instructed to propose that
the World Bank provide advice and assistance to nations wishing to engage in debt
for development swaps. 22 U.S.C. § 262p-4c (1988). Debt-for-development swaps
are defined in the statute as the "purchase of qualified debt by, or donation of such
debt to" a tax-exempt charitable organization, and "subsequent transfer of such debt
to an organization in such foreign country in exchange for an undertaking by such
tax-exempt organization, such foreign government, or such foreign organization to
engage in a charitable, educational or scientific activity." Id. at § 262p-4c(b)(2)(A).
The statute further states that such charitable, educational, or scientific activities
include "environmental conservation, education, human welfare, agricultural
research and development, microenterprise credit, and development of indigenous
nonprofit organizations. Id. at § 262p-4c(a)(1).
75. Foreign Operations, supra note 2, pt. 5, at 104 (statement of Ambassador Alan
Woods, Administrator, Agency for International Development); Chamberlin, Gruson
& Weltchek, supra note 1, at 448-49. The substance of debt-for-nature swaps
depends upon what the debtor nation is willing to offer in exchange for a release
from the debt repayment. Creditors play a substantial role in negotiating the
exchange, but generally are limited by the scope of environmental concessions the
debtor nation is willing to make. Given the variety of creditors holding its debt, only
the debtor nation can develop programs that incorporate individual exchanges into
its overall economic strategy. Id.
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nature swaps depends on the degree to which the program can address
the specific needs and concerns of that nation. In some countries, the
spectre of external control over natural resources is the greatest hin-
drance to agreement, whereas others nations welcome the administra-
tive aid of charitable organizations. 7 6 Some countries may prefer to
immediately convert debt into currency rather than long-term bonds. In
April 1989, for example, Ecuador converted $9 million of debt
purchased by WWF and the Nature Conservancy into currency, repre-
senting the first debt-for-nature swap in which the full face value of the
debt was redeemed in local currency. 77 Moreover, the funds from that
swap are being used to establish specific protected regions totalling
some 2.5 million acres in the Andean Region and Ecuadorian Ama-
zon.78 The form of conversion and use of funds will be largely a matter
of the debtor's preference, subject to negotiation. Some debtor nations
have already drawn up specific debt exchange programs to accommo-
date foreign creditors wishing to engage in debt for equity swaps, 79
but most nations conduct debt-for-nature swaps largely on an ad hoc
basis.8 0
C. Limitations of Debt-for-Nature Swaps
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of debt-for-nature swaps, there
are several problems which limit their effectiveness or prevent their real-
ization. The three largest owners of tropical forest land - Brazil, Zaire,
and Indonesia8 t - have maintained three reasons for resisting debt-for-
nature swaps. First, debt-for-nature swaps infringe on national sover-
76. See Piddington, Sovereignty & the Environment, ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1989, at 18.
77. Weisskopf, Ecuador Gets Aid For Debt, Environment, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1989, at
A20, col. 6.
78. Id.
79. See generally M. DEFARIA, D. SToTr & T. BUCHANAN, supra note 2 (outlining
formal debt exchange programs of several debtor nations).
80. So far only one country, Nigeria, has proposed a formal program stating
guidelines for exchanges involving non-commercial activities such as environmental
conservation. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 1, at 448 n.1 18.
Since 1987, debt-for-nature swaps have also been effected in Costa Rica, the Phil-
ippines, and Madagascar, with more than $15 million in foreign debt being converted
to conservation activities. Work & Smith, Using Red Ink To Keep Tropical Forests Green,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 6, 1989, at 49; Madagascar: A Debt to Nature, ECONO-
MIST, Aug. 19, 1989, at 31. Debt-for-nature swaps are also under consideration in
Brazil, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Poland, Tanzania, and Venezuela. Chamber-
lin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 1, at 445. Recently, several debtor nations have
issued pleas for such swaps to fund environmental protection, and the desire to par-
ticipate apparently now exceeds the capacity of environmental organizations such as
the WWF to accommodate them. See Hulktrans, supra note 31, at 44 (Costa Rica
issued plea for debt-for-nature swaps); The Proposed General Capital Increase for The
World Bank, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Development Institutions and
Finance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess.
133-35 (1988) (President of African Bank calls for debt-for-nature swaps).
81. These three nations own 48% of the world's tropical forests. Foreign Opera-
tions, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 11.
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eignty by vesting control over natural resources in foreign creditors. 8 2
Second, debt-for-nature swaps are too small to be of any consequence. 83
Finally, any prohibitions on commercial use of natural resources are
economically impractical. 84 To these criticisms a fourth should be
added, namely, that due to both their size and structure debt-for-nature
swaps are largely ineffective as a means of preventing continued destruc-
tion of the rain forests. This section will examine these four criticisms.
1. Sovereignty
Several critics, the Brazilian government foremost among them, have
stated that the environmental conditions imposed by debt-for-nature
swaps interfere with the sovereignty of the debtor nation. 85 This objec-
tion takes two related forms. First, critics allege that debt-for-nature
swaps vest control over the debtor nation's land and resources in for-
eign creditors, equating the transaction with a sale of land.8 6 Secondly,
critics claim that debt-for-nature swaps facilitate the imposition of for-
eign projects and values. 8 7 These criticisms are largely unjustified.
A flexible approach to negotiating debt-for-nature swaps can elimi-
nate most concerns over the imposition of foreign projects and values.
Debt-for-nature swap proposals are subject to the review and approval
of the debtor government. Moreover, most debt-for-nature swaps have
been proposed by local groups within debtor nations as a means of
increasing the effectiveness of their own projects.8 8 Since debt-for-
nature swaps are negotiated and approved by the debtor nation and
generally are defined, and often managed, by local groups, there is little
chance for environmental organizations to "impose" foreign control.
Likewise, debt-for-nature swaps do not involve the transfer of any
right of ownership or control to the foreign creditors. 89 The debtor
nation may agree not to exploit certain regions, yet retain regulatory
power over the region's use. Environmental groups offering debt-for-
nature swaps seek to secure environmental protections, not to obtain
title to the land.
Although sovereignty concerns are largely unjustified, they remain
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id.
84. Work & Smith, supra note 80.
85. Under international law each nation has an inalienable right to exploit its own
resources in conformity with its national policies. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (xvii), 17 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
86. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 1, at 441 n.103; Petesch & Annis,
supra note 71, at 7; Piddington, supra note 76.
87. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note I, at 441 n.103.
88. Id. Conservation organizations negotiating debt-for-nature swaps recognize
the need for support by local groups to effectuate environmental protections and
thus prefer to allow local groups to define the scope of the environmental program.
89. See, e.g., Bolivian Agreement, supra note 61, at 515.
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perhaps the largest impediment to debt-for-nature swaps in Brazil. 90
While Brazil has recently enacted modest environmental reforms,9 1 it
has refused to accept debt-for-nature swaps as a means of funding such
reforms. 9 2 Brazil apparently does not, as a matter of policy, oppose
establishing protected rain forest areas. However, its leaders view debt-
for-nature swaps as establishing a dangerous precedent by creating a
perception of foreign economic interests in Brazil's natural resources. 93
To reduce debtor nation resistance to debt-for-nature swaps, con-
servation organizations should focus on funding programs proposed
and managed by local groups in the debtor nation, rather than on pro-
posing new programs and protected areas. Diminishing the extent to
which foreign creditors shape the policy of the swap and the extent to
which specific lands and resources are involved in the transaction will
lessen the perceived impositions on debtor nation sovereignty.
2. Limited Benefits
Some debtor nations feel that debt-for-nature swaps are too small to be
of any practical significance. Debt-for-nature swaps offer millions of
dollars of debt relief,94 but many nations owe billions in debt. 95 Debtor
nations are concerned that any attention given to debt-for-nature swaps
will divert attention from larger solutions.9 6
90. Brazil's former President, Jose Sarney, repeatedly stated that debt-for-nature
swaps are an unacceptable "form of colonialism." Rowen, supra note 7, at H10.
91. Brazil's new constitution, which took effect October 5, 1988, contains provi-
sions for grants of "extractive reserves," i.e., legally protected forest areas desig-
nated for exclusive use by rubber tappers, nut gatherers, and other "extractivists."
Rain forest communities have received long term (up to 30 year) renewable contracts
for the use of the land. This program has met with substantial resistance from ranch-
ers, often culminating in violence. On December 22, 1988, assassins hired by ranch-
ers killed a prominent rubber tapper. Fearnside, Extractive Reserves in Brazilian
Amazonia, BIOSCIENCE, June 1989, at 387; Hecht & Cockburn, supra note 31, at 695.
In early 1989, President Jose Sarney announced a plan for increased environmen-
tal reform. Called "Our Nature," the program includes zoning regions for limited
uses, temporarily suspending raw timber exports, and reducing tax incentives to
Amazon cattle ranchers. Semill, A Dubious Plan for the Amazons, TIME, Apr. 17, 1989, at
67.
92. Semill, supra note 91, at 67.
93. When President Sarney announced his new environmental program, he reit-
erated his rejection of debt-for-nature swaps. The program's title, "Our Nature,"
reinforces Brazil's claim that the Amazon forests belong to Brazilians, not to the
world. Id.
94. The debt-for-nature swaps so far executed have converted approximately $25
million in developing country debt. See sources cited supra note 80.
95. The total of developing country debt is approximately $1.3 trillion. INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 186 (Apr. 1989). Brazil's out-
standing debt is roughly $106 billion, and Indonesia owes approximately $45 billion
to foreign creditors. WORLD BANK, supra note 48, at 42, 190.
96. This objection was raised by the Ministers of Economics of Brazil, Zaire, and
Indonesia at a 1989 meeting. Foreign Operations, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 11-12.
It is possible, however, that Brazil's resistance to debt-for-nature swaps will actu-
ally hinder the offering of other forms of debt relief. Senators Albert Gore (D-
Tenn.), John Heinz (R-Pa.), and Tim Wirth (D-Colo.) have suggested that the U.S.
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The amount of debt converted in debt-for-nature swaps is limited
primarily by the debtor nation. The size of the transaction will depend
upon how much converted debt the debtor nation is willing to invest in
environmental programs. Environmental protections are generally
viewed as unprofitable, and thus major capital commitments to conser-
vation rather than economic development is counterproductive. 9 7
Debt-for-nature swaps also involve complex multiparty negotia-
tions. Therefore, the transaction costs of reaching an agreement may
seem unjustified by the relatively small scope of the exchange. The
transaction costs result from the number of parties involved and the lack
of established mechanisms for structuring such swaps. One significant
issue in negotiating debt-for-conservation swaps is putting a dollar value
on the land to be protected. Parties will have to agree on how many
square miles (or hectares) of rain forest can be protected with a given
amount of debt relief. Parties will also have to agree upon methods of
implementing the conservation programs. With little or no precedent
on which to rely, resolving these issues may require substantial
negotiations.
Debt-for-nature swaps which fund existing programs rather than
"purchase" protection for specific areas will eliminate the need to estab-
lish arbitrary prices for environmental protections. Moreover, funding
existing programs eliminates the need to establish mechanisms for car-
rying out the conservation measures.
One means of making debt-for-nature swaps more attractive is
through cooperation among creditors to incorporate the swaps into
larger debt relief plans. Were debt-for-nature swaps to be included in a
"package" of debt relief, they would be viewed as accommodating larger
debt relief strategies rather than diverting attention from them. Fur-
thermore, if such packages were offered, the transaction costs of negoti-
ating individual debt-for-nature swaps would to some extent be
absorbed by the overall transaction.
3. Economic Impracticality
Much resistance to debt-for-nature swaps stems from the reality that
debtor nations cannot foreclose access to natural resources needed for
commercial activities. Developing countries place great reliance on
their natural resources to produce revenues and foster development.
For example, ninety-eight percent of Bolivia's exports are "primary
products": fuels, minerals, metals, and agricultural products. Many
other developing countries in Latin America and Africa have similarly
high rates of resource dependence.98 Countries in the Amazon whose
refuse to give Brazil significant debt relief unless they compromise on rain forest
protections. Rowen, supra note 7, at HI0.
97. This attitude was expressed by Brazil's interior MinisterJoto Alves, who said
"We understand the Amazon's ecological value, but we have to create 1.7 million
new jobs each year and must tap its resources." Work & Smith, supra note 80, at 49.
98. MacNeil, supra note 11, at 158.
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rain forests comprise a large part of the topography must exploit these
areas in order to foster economic growth.
In Brazil, which houses thirty percent of the world's rain forests,
activities which destroy the rain forests have long been a substantial part
of the national economy. Cattle ranching and farming on converted rain
forest land were, until recently, subsidized by generous tax credits from
the government because of the substantial revenues these activities ini-
tially produce.9 9 Timber cut from the rain forest produces significant
export revenues, and wood still accounts for a large part of Brazil's
energy use in rural areas.1 00
While extractive, renewable uses may be more profitable in the long
run, Brazil may not be able to afford the short-term costs of discontinu-
ing current commercial practices for which a ready market exists.
Restricting commercial logging in the rain forests, for example, would
deprive Brazil of its substantial timber export revenues. Japan, which
annually imports forty percent of the world's trade in tropical hard-
woods from rain forests, recently began importing timber from the Bra-
zilian Amazon after supplies elsewhere were depleted. 10 1
The rural poor constitute the majority of Brazil's population, and
many of them in the Amazon and elsewhere rely on farming and ranch-
ing for their livelihoods. 10 2 Turning the Amazon into a wildlife pre-
serve would greatly exacerbate local poverty, increase demands on
depleted government social programs, and decrease revenues from the
foreclosed activities. Despite the theoretical correctness of avoiding
imminent environmental harm, environmentalists cannot ignore a cost-
benefit analysis in seeking to effectively protect the rain forests. 10 3
D. Limitations of Environmental Protectionism
Conservation reserves created through debt-for-nature swaps may coex-
ist with the traditional revenue-producing activities such as ranching and
farming. Debt-for-nature swaps which establish specifically protected
areas currently cover only a small portion of the rain forests in partici-
pating countries. Thus, even with such programs in place, environmen-
tally destructive commercial activities may continue in other
99. See id.; Government Policies Promote Deforestation, supra note 33; Reid, supra note
30, at 9, 32.
100. Tropical Forests, supra note 15, at 37-38.
101. Id. at 37.
102. The Brazilian Government has enticed vast numbers of poor settlers to the
rain forests with subsidies for farming, ranching, and clearcutting. Id. Brazil has a
highly inequitable wealth distribution, under which rain forest dwellers live on
incomes far below the per capita average. C. CARVOUNIS, supra note 11, at 171, 174.
Among rural Brazilian workers counted as "economically active," 27.3% receive no
real salary, while 42.9% received less than or equal to the official minimum salary,
which itself is below subsistence levels. The nominal minimum wage in Brazil is,
depending on inflation levels, between one-fifth and one-seventh of the amount
needed to cover a family's basic needs. S. GEORGE, supra note 11, at 122-23.
103. See supra note 97 (statement ofJado Alves); Stavins, supra note 8; Fearnside,
Extractive Reserves in Brazilian Amazonia, BIOSCIENCE, June 1989, at 392.
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unprotected areas. This rationalization defeats the purpose of debt-for-
nature swaps and exposes a potential flaw inherent in the limited scope
of such transactions. While converting the entire rain forest into a
reserve is currently economically infeasible, protecting only specific
parts of it may offer very little protection to rain forests as a whole.
Debt-for-development swaps such as the one implemented in
Bolivia have also proven somewhat ineffective. Under the Bolivian swap
agreement, Bolivia was to grant logging rights within the protected area
subject to the condition that loggers plant new trees sufficient to replace
those they had cut down. While many trees have been cut, as of April
1989 not a single tree had been planted.10 4 The Bolivian agreement
attempts to affect environmentally destructive commercial activity with
environmental protections. 10 5 To be successful, the plan requires coer-
cive enforcement of the reforestation provisions. If Bolivia fails to
enforce those provisions, the environmental protections contemplated
by the agreement become worthless.
Both the Bolivian debt-for-development swap and straight debt-for-
nature swaps contemplate a coexistence of environmentally destructive
activities and environmental protections. Both fail to address the
perceived antagonism between economic development and the environ-
ment. Rather than seeking concessions to the environment, conserva-
tionists should try to make environmental protection attractive to
developing nations, or at least economically feasible. Protecting the
environment requires not only setting aside reserve areas, but more
importantly, reducing reliance on ecologically destructive activities and
creating economic incentives for protecting the environment.
IV. Alternative Forms of Debt Exchanges
A. Sustainable Development: Environmental Protection through
Economic Growth
There are alternatives to pure debt-for-nature swaps that may both
increase economic development and create incentives to protect the
environment. The most beneficial form of debt swap would be one
which stimulates "sustainable development." °10 6 In practical terms, this
form requires making current environmentally sound commercial activi-
ties more profitable and making currently profitable activities more envi-
ronmentally sound.
Sustainable development practices must be designed on a case-by-
case basis, giving special attention to the conditions of a particular envi-
ronment and the needs of local people. The primary objectives of sus-
104. Collet, supra note 64, at 4.
105. See Bolivian Agreement, supra note 61.
106. "Sustainable development" is defined by the World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development as "that which meets the needs and aspirations of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."
Reid, supra note 30, at 7.
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tainable development techniques are increasing agricultural efficiency,
promoting restoration ecology, and promoting efficient energy use.
1. Agriculture
Environmental organizations and scientists working in conjunction with
local groups in developing countries have in recent years developed a
number of strategies for promoting environmentally and economically
sustainable development within the rain forests and in other topograph-
ical regions.' 0 7 Previously infertile or degraded lands have been made
arable through techniques which increase the productivity of the lands
and reduce degradation due to erosion, salinization, and drying of water
sources. 108
Each year, the need to replace degraded agricultural soil causes
more than half of the deforestation in the rain forests.' 0 9 "Indeed, deg-
radation of arable land will depress food production 15 and 30 percent
between 1975 and 2000."'10 Thus, making farmlands in developing
countries sustainable can potentially cut current deforestation in half
and foster economic development by increasing crop output and reduc-
ing the investment costs of clearing new lands and relocating farms.
From both an economic and environmental standpoint, this type of pro-
gram if properly realized is far more effective than a pure debt-for-con-
servation swap.
Many of the new strategies provide for greater agricultural and
range productivity, including soil and water conservation techniques,
intercropping, "'1 agroforestry, 112 and organic fertilization. These strat-
egies can be implemented at very low costs, thus increasing the per dol-
lar returns of debt exchanges."13 Simple techniques can greatly
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 8.
110. Id.
111. Intercropping is a technique of producing several types of agricultural prod-
ucts on one piece of land to reduce the nutrient depletion often caused by growing a
single crop. Id. at 29.
112. Agroforestry is a system of tree farming within controlled areas. Trees are
maintained and their products, including fruit, nuts, and latex, are harvested. When
trees are cut for use as fuel or lumber, they are replaced with seedlings. Id. at 34; D.
BROKENSHA & A.P. CASTRO, FUELWOOD, AGROFORESTRY & NATURAL RESOURCE MAN-
AGEMENT: THE DEVELOPMENT SIGNIFICANCE OF LAND TENURE & OTHER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT/UTILIZATION SYSTEMS 14-18 (1984).
113. Reid, supra note 30, at 29. Much of this knowledge is derived from groups
indigenous to developing countries. For example, in tropical forests, farmlands are
generally sustainable for only two to three years owing to rapid soil nutrient deple-
tion. Yet local groups in Southern Brazil, by practicing traditional methods of soil
enrichment and cropping, are able to sustain productive rain forest farmland for 11
years, with only a five year fallow period. Id.
While these simple, high-yielding methods of increasing productivity exist within
the developing countries, many debtor nations lack the resources to gather and dis-
seminate this information, educate farmers and ranchers, or supply even minimal
amounts of funding to implement these programs. Most nations have environmental
and agricultural development agencies, but they are generally among the first to fall
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increase agricultural productivity. For example, establishing windbreaks
along farmlands can significantly reduce soil erosion and increase soil
moisture. 114 Irrigation techniques and controlled grazing can substan-
tially increase sustainability of rangeland. Intercropping-the alterna-
tion of crops planted on a single site-reduces soil nutrient depletion.
Establishing programs to increase agricultural efficiency would pro-
vide both environmental and economic benefits. Sustainable agricul-
tural practices would enable impoverished rain forest inhabitants to
better meet their own subsistence needs and possibly obtain added
income from the sale of excess crops. 15 By reducing the need to clear
rain forest land for farming, sustainable agricultural practices offer great
potential for preserving rain forests without having to impose protec-
tionist measures.
2. Reforestation
Beyond reducing burdens on remaining forest land, developmental aid
might also promote restoration ecology in order to revitalize depleted
areas. Clear-cut lands suffer from soil erosion including nutrient and
water depletion. 1 6 Reforestation of these areas is not only possible but
potentially profitable. A recent pilot program in Haiti, where ninety per-
cent of indigenous forests have been lost since 1950, has demonstrated
the economic and environmental benefits of agroforestry, or tree farm-
ing.1 17 Funded by developmental aid, local peasants reclaimed depleted
lands through organized tree planting. Agroforestry has not only pro-
vided steady incomes to impoverished people through the sale of wood
and tree products, but has restored to decimated lands a capacity for
sustainable use.
Trees buffer surrounding soil against erosion and can serve to
increase moisture and fertility in the surrounding soil, thereby accom-
modating further crop production. While agroforestry will not restore
the rain forests, it can convert otherwise useless lands to sustainable use
and to some degree compensate for the effects of deforestation upon
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. Moreover, by producing timber and
other crops, agroforestry can reduce the need for further deforestation
under the axe of emergency budget cuts as countries try to service their debts. S.
GEORGE, supra note 11, at 167.
114. Reid, supra note 30, at 29.
115. Poverty among the rural poor is a significant inhibitor of economic and social
development in Third World nations. Most debtor nations have very large income
disparities between classes, with widespread and severe poverty among the lower
classes. See supra note 102. Inefficient agricultural production results in food
shortages and high food prices. See S. GEORGE, supra note 11, at 119-53; D. BROKEN-
SHA & A.P. CASTRO, supra note 112. Because of these conditions, developmental
strategies aimed at industrialization will not effectively promote development in
Third World countries. Rather, attention should be focused on relieving local pov-
erty levels and increasing food production. See Makgetla, External Influences on Third
World Debt, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 591 (1989).
116. Reid, supra note 30, at 29.
117. Id. at 34; seesupra note 112.
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and can revitalize local economies by fostering profitable development
in impoverished areas. 18
3. Energy Efficency
Another form of developmental aid with potentially high economic and
environmental benefits is the implementation of more efficient energy
use techniques.' 1 9 Inefficient energy use contributes to both economic
and environmental problems. In the early 1980s, low-income develop-
ing countries spent sixty-one percent of their export earnings on oil
imports. 12 Biomass, mostly wood, currently accounts for more than
forty percent of energy use in developing countries.1 2 1 Developing
nations must either spend their revenues on foreign oil or cut trees from
their forests for fuel. Increased energy efficiency in cookstoves and
other apparatus could reduce both trade imbalances and deforestation
in debtor nations, yet less than one percent of all foreign aid to develop-
ing nations is earmarked for improving energy efficiency. 12 2
B. Debt-for-sustainable-development Swaps
Achieving sustainable development is possible.' 23 Developed nations
have recently focused foreign aid policies on implementing sustainable
development programs in Third World nations.124 A program of debt-
118. Reid, supra note 30, at 34.
119. See Foreign Operations, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 426-89, 494-30, 533-61.
Many recent plans for increasing energy efficiency in developing countries are cast
in terms of "sustainable development." Ironically, many such plans urge greater reli-
ance on biomass for fuel as a means of promoting reforestation. Id. at 536. As with
employing agroforestry to produce timber, use of biomass resources for energy
would encourage reforestation and forest management to insure long-term energy
supply. Id. Moreover, reducing reliance on foreign oil imports would ease trade
imbalances and reduce outflows of capital. Id. at 427.
120. Reid, supra note 30, at 9.
121. Foreign Operations, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 429.
122. Reid, supra note 30, at 29.
123. Id.
124. See G-7 Summit Leaders' Endorsement of Sustainable Development Welcomed, 11 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 367 (1988).
A 1986 statute directs the U.S. President to "[p]lace a high priority on conserva-
tion and sustainable management of tropical forests" in providing assistance to
developing countries. 22 U.S.C. § 2151p-l(c)(1) (1988). The statute lists several
sustainable development practices which can help protect the rain forests. The stat-
ute states, in part:
(c) In providing assistance to developing countries, the President shall do the
following:
(3) To the fullest extent feasible, support projects and activities-
(A) which offer employment and income alternatives to those who
otherwise would cause destruction and loss of forests ....
(5) To the fullest extent feasible, help end destructive slash and burn
agriculture by supporting stable and productive farming practices in
areas already cleared or degraded and on lands which inevitably will be
settled, with special emphasis on demonstrating the feasibility of
agroforestry and other techniques which use technologies and methods
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for-sustainable-development swaps would promote development and
environmental protections through existing debt renegotiation
techniques.
An optimal debt relief program would produce and implement
plans for sustainable development by including funds for agencies or
other groups in the debtor nation. Converted debt would be earmarked
for research and education in sustainable development techniques, and
economic aid to farmers, ranchers, and other local groups seeking to
implement such techniques. As with debt-for-nature swaps, various
techniques of conversion and remittance of funds could be employed,
tailoring the program to fit the developing country's individual needs.
Debt-for-sustainable-development programs may involve an extra
element of human capital. Sustainable development projects are the
product of cooperation among scientists, government agencies, nongov-
ernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations. 125 In
many developing countries these groups are already devising sustaina-
ble development programs. Thus debt exchanges need only provide
funding for sustainable development activities on a larger scale.
1 26
Debt-for-sustainable-development swaps do not specifically con-
serve rain forests by establishing protected reserves, although such
measures might be included in the bargain. Rather, this arrangement
provides indirect protection of rain forests by establishing economic
incentives, both at the national and local level, encouraging activities
which reduce the burdens on rain forests. Virtually all developing
nations realize the gravity of environmental destruction and seek to curb
it. Nevertheless, the destruction continues largely as a matter of eco-
suited to the local environment and traditional agricultural techniques
and feature close consultation with and involvement of local people.
(6) To the fullest extent feasible, help conserve forests which have not
yet been degraded, by helping to increase production on lands already
cleared or degraded through support of reforestation, fuelwood, and
other sustainable forestry projects and practices, making sure that local
people are involved at all stages of project design and implementation
125. Reid, supra note 30, at 32-35. "Private Voluntary Organizations" (PVOs) is
the term of art designating charitable organizations, such as the World Wildlife Fed-
eration. "Nongovernmental organizations" (NGOs) generally refers to special inter-
est groups, such as the Brazilian Union of Rubber Tappers. Id.
126. A 1987 statute instructs the U.S. Director of the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Development Association to propose a "Grassroots Collaboration Program"
aimed at "encouraging nongovernmental organizations in borrowing countries to
participate in all stages of [development] project planning and country strategy activ-
ities .. " 22 U.S.C. § 262p-1 (1988). The statute recognizes that NGOs may have a
"distinct comparative advantage" over other entities in administering developmental
programs. It specifically recommends "supporting the enhancement of the institu-
tional capacity of nongovernmental organizations in borrowing countries as develop-
ment practitioners ...... 22 U.S.C. § 262p-l(a)(4). This shift in policy towards
supporting development through micro-scale administration by NGOs will facilitate
debt-for-sustainable-development swaps by establishing specific developmental pro-
grams to which exchanged funds can be paid.
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nomic necessity. By shifting economic incentives from destructive to
non-destructive activities, debt-for-sustainable-development swaps can
foster a modicum of economic recovery on a national level, increase liv-
ing standards at the local level, and allow debtor nations to better pur-
sue their own environmental objectives. Likewise, by avoiding site-
specific nature reserves and focusing on local poverty and production
activities, this type of swap removes the onus of economic coercion and
environmental imperialism, in favor of social and economic cooperation.
Mechanisms for negotiating and implementing debt-for-sustaina-
ble-development swaps already exist, but current debt restructuring
procedures 1 2 7 have inhibited their implementation. Consequently, pro-
gress in development and environmental protections have been pre-
vented. Realization of the potential benefits of debt-for-development
swaps will require greater involvement from developed nations and mul-
tilateral development banks(MDBs). Specifically, the U.S. and the
World Bank should take the lead in structuring strategies for debt relief
and development including debt-for-sustainable-development swaps.
V. The United States and the World Bank
Both the U.S. and the World Bank have recently expressed stronger
commitments to environmental and developmental reforms through
legislation and policy statements, 128 yet neither seems poised to imple-
ment effectively its espoused policies. Encouraging and facilitating
debt-for-sustainable-development swaps may be one means of promot-
ing environmental reforms.
As leaders in international economic policy, the U.S. and the World
Bank have the capacity to integrate debt-for-sustainable-development
swaps with larger plans of developmental aid and debt relief. Develop-
ing nations which rely heavily on commercial banks, MDBs, and foreign
governments for continuing economic assistance may take a dim view of
a one-time debt-for-development transaction negotiated by a charitable
organization. Alternatively, were the U.S. and World Bank to aid in
facilitating debt swaps by integrating them into larger debt relief and
developmental strategies, they could increase both the swap's attractive-
ness and its effectiveness in achieving their own ends.
127. See supra text at pt. III.C.2. Like debt-for-nature swaps, debt-for-sustainable-
development swaps would involve several parties and substantial negotiations.
Because sustainable development techniques are best administered on local levels,
parties may have to negotiate specific programs for specific areas where such pro-
grams are not already in place. Furthermore, depending on the amount of funds the
debtor nation is willing to commit to sustainable development programs, debtor
nations may object that these swaps are too small in comparison to debt-for-equity or
other commercial debt exchanges to be of any practical benefit.
128. See Holden, supra note 43; 22 U.S.C. § 2621. "It is the policy of the United
States that sustainable economic growth must be predicated on the sustainable man-
agement of natural resources." Id. at § 2621(1).
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A. Revenue Ruling 87-124
The U.S. has taken steps in the past few years to encourage debt-for-
nature and debt-for-development swaps, albeit with little success. In
November 1987 the U.S. Treasury announced that it would construe
Revenue Ruling 87-124 to allow commercial banks a deduction for the
full principal amount of debt donated to charitable activities in debtor
nations.1 2 9 Previously a bank could deduct only the fair market value of
the donated debt, which was significantly lower than the bank's cost
basis. Under the new interpretation, the bank would be entitled to a
charitable deduction equal to the fair market value of the donated debt,
and the balance of its cost basis would be deductible as a business
lOSS. 1 3 0
Currently, the only financial institution to avail itself of this deduc-
tion is the Fleet Norstar Financial Group, which in February 1988
donated $250,000 of Costa Rican debt to that nation's central bank.13 '
Many banks, however, have been unwilling to discount or sell their
loans. By selling discounted loan holdings, banks would realize a loss
on the loans. Realizing a loss on loans may adversely affect the bank's
credit rating and increase its cost of borrowing. I3 2 Recognizing the full
face value of the debt as a charitable deduction would be a more effec-
tive incentive, since it would not involve recognition of a loss. However,
guardians of U.S. tax policy would no doubt find such an approach too
extreme. 133
B. The World Bank and Debt Exchanges
The World Bank can play a vital role in facilitating debt-for-sustainable-
development swaps. Although the majority of Latin American debt is
owed to commercial banks, the World Bank also holds a large amount of
overall developing country debt13 4 and, as an independent non-com-
mercial institution, is in a better position to monitor policy-oriented eco-
nomic activity. World Bank President Barber Conable has announced
that in recognition of the Bank's influence in developing countries and
its past contributions to environmental destruction he has instituted a
129. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205; Dionne, Treasury Agrees to Construe Revenue
Ruling on Debt For Nature Swaps Liberally, 39 TAx NoTEs 307 (1988).
130. Dionne, supra note 129, at 308.
131. Conservation Groups Help, supra note 10, at 38.
132. Giaimo, supra note 5, at 567.
133. The Treasury's current construction of Revenue Ruling 87-124 has been criti-
cized as "a complete reversal" of the Internal Revenue Service's traditional interpre-
tations of the Internal Revenue Code sections dealing with losses, bad debts, and
charitable contributions. Halperin, Revenue Ruling 87-124: Treasury's Flawed Interpreta-
tion of Debt For Nature Swaps, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 721, 725 (1989).
134. As of 1987, the World Bank held about 8.2 percent of developing-country
debt. WORLD BANK, supra note 48, vol. I, at xl. That figure is likely to increase, since
commercial banks have substantially decreased new lending to indebted nations in
recent years. Official creditors, including the IMF and the regional development
banks, held 42%Y of all developing country debt at the end of 1988, up from 32%7 at
the end of 1983. Id. at ix, 1st Supp.
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program geared towards environmental reform.13 5 President Conable
has since created a new, high-level Environmental Department' 3 6 which
has mandated greater consideration of the environmental impact of
Bank-funded projects as well as loans for specific conservation activities
such as reforestation. 13 7
Conspicuously absent from the World Bank's environmental
agenda is any mention of debt-for-nature or development swaps. Unlike
certain commercial banks, the World Bank has never discounted any of
its loans, and it is unlikely that the Bank will offer any form of debt
reduction or forgiveness. l3 8 Recognition of a loss on loans would
adversely affect the Bank's credit rating, possibly limiting the amount of
funds available to it and increasing the interest rates it would need to
charge on its loans.' 3 9 Given the importance of the World Bank in
international lending, debt exchanges should be viewed as a plan of last
resort. 140
135. Tyler, Repaying the Green Debt, WORLD PRESS REV., Feb. 1988, at 48.
136. World Bank Will Change to Protect Environmental Conable Tells WRI, 10 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 207 (1987).
137. Grieves, Poverty as Pollution, FORBES, Nov. 14, 1988, at 205.
138. See The Proposed General Capital Increase For The World Bank: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Development Institutions and Finance of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1988, at 139 [hereinafter Pro-
posed General Capital Increase].
The World Bank is not authorized under its charter to forgive any part of its debt
holdings. ARTCLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 38, at art. IV. In cases where a debtor
defaults or is unable to meet its obligations due to "acute exchange stringency," the
Bank may modify the terms of amortization of the loan, extend the life of the loan, or
accept service payments on the loan in the debtor nation's currency for periods not
to exceed three years. Id. at § 4(c)(i).
The World Bank often attempts to ease developing countries' debt burden by giv-
ing "structural adjustment loans" - funds aimed at promoting economic develop-
ment and keeping debtors liquid. Specifically, the loans are designed to
accommodate changes in the debtor nation's economic structure and are conditional
upon implementing specified economic reforms. See Proposed General Capital Increase,
supra, at 151-213. However, structural adjustment loans are specifically excluded
from the Bank's environmental review policy. Henwood, A Banker's World, NATION,
Oct. 30, 1989, at 481. Thus environmental concerns are not incorporated within the
Bank's debt relief programs.
139. Giaimo, supra note 5, at 567.
The interest rates that the Bank charges on loans are calculated by a formula based
on the Bank's cost of borrowing. It can only lend money for productive purposes
with due regard for the prospects of repayment. ARTIcLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note
38, at art. I; Muldoon, supra note 39, at 9 n.25. To the extent that a change in the
Bank's credit rating raises its cost of borrowihg, the rates the World Bank would have
to charge on loans to developing countries would also increase. Furthermore, having
to recognize loss on a loan to a given country might also affect the prospects for
repayment on future loans made to that country, possibly limiting the amount the
Bank could loan.
140. The World Bank is a lender of last resort. It can make loans to countries only
where "the Bank is satisfied that in prevailing market conditions the borrower would
be unable otherwise to obtain the loan under conditions which in the opinion of the
Bank are reasonable for the borrower." ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 38, at
art. III, § 4(ii).
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A bill introduced before Congress in 1987 would instruct the U.S.
executive directors of the World Bank to encourage adoption of a pilot
program of debt-for-nature swaps. 14 1 A similar program is advocated
by the president of the African Development Bank. 14 2 It seems unlikely
at present that either the U.S. or the World Bank will seriously consider
such proposals. 143
Current U.S. policy assumes, however, that the World Bank can
assist others in effecting debt exchanges. Under a 1988 statute, the U.S.
executive directors of the World Bank are instructed to propose that the
Bank provide advice and assistance to institutions and nations seeking to
participate in "debt-for-development swaps for human welfare and envi-
ronmental conservation."' 14 4
A recent bill recommended for passage by the House Committee on
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs states similar objectives with
greater specificity.' 4 5 Under the Committee's recommended version of
H.R. 2494, the U.S. executive directors would encourage the World
Bank to "vigorously promote" policies for the protection of the tropical
rain forests, including debt-for-nature swaps. 146 The bill also reiterates
requirements relating to debt-for-development swaps, listing certain
examples. 147
Limited resources and objectives of private charitable organizations
and the complexities of international negotiations support arguments
for coordination of debt reduction activities through an international
facility such as the World Bank. Such an institution, engaging in policy-
based lending for the environment, development, and debt relief, could
integrate debt exchanges with each nation's overall debt relief strate-
gies, thereby increasing their efficacy. Moreover, small-scale debt
exchanges, while not overwhelmingly enticing on their own, may be con-
siderably more attractive when offered as part of a comprehensive plan
for debt relief and development.
It remains to be seen whether the World Bank can effectively coor-
dinate debt relief programs and facilitate debt exchanges. Some critics
have claimed that the Bank has been largely unable to integrate its envi-
141. H.R. 3010, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987) (introduced July 23, 1987),
reprinted in The Proposed General Capital Increase, supra note 138, at 408.
142. The Proposed General Capital Increase, supra note 138, at 134, 348. Because most
African debt is owed to governments and multilateral development banks, which do
not sell their debt holdings on the secondary market, debt-for-nature swaps would
require participation by the World Bank and other multilateral banks.
143. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
144. 22 U.S.C. § 262p-4c(b) (1988).
145. The Committee approved H.R. 2494, the International Development and
Finance Act of 1989, with amendments. H.R. 2494 is intended to amend the Export-
Import Bank Act of 1945. H.R. REP. No. 271, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21-23, reprinted
in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3557, 3559-60.
146. International Development and Finance Act of 1989, 22 U.S.C. § 262p.5
(1989) (this subtitle is also known as the Tropical Forest Protection Act of 1989).
147. Id. at § 531.
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ronmental policy into its project lending,1 48 raising doubts as to
whether it could also manage environmental and sustainable develop-
ment programs of debt relief.14 9 Optimally, the Bank would create a
new department for debt relief management, whose duty it would be to
coordinate debt relief plans.
C. The Proposed Debt Management Facility
A more ambitious idea is to establish a new international facility for
development and debt relief management. The institution would be
empowered with a mandate towards the combined goals of debt relief,
economic recovery, sustainable development, and environmental pro-
tection. Congress has entertained, with some skepticism, proposals for
an international debt management facility, but most such proposals have
focused almost exclusively on the economic aspects of debt relief and
development.
The proposed facility might take a number of forms. It could exist
as an independent arm of either the World Bank or the International
Monetary Fund, as a joint venture between the World Bank and the
IMF, or as a completely new international institution. 150 The primary
feature of the institution would be the ability to purchase discounted
debt from commercial banks and to negotiate policy-oriented debt relief
packages with debtor nations.15 The facility would be directed to
include debt-for-nature and debt-for-sustainable-development swaps,
where practicable, in its debt relief program.
One of the major impediments to establishing an international debt
management facility is the issue of funding. Participating developed
148. Critics claim that the World Bank's environmental department is too small to
effectively evaluate environmental concerns in proposed projects, and that the Bank
either fails to perceive many environmental problems or fails to address adequately
those problems. See Proposed General Capital Increase, supra note 138, at 340-47; NROC
Seeks Reversal of Reductions in Environmental Staff Proposed by World Bank, 11 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 14 (1988); World Bank Should Be Held Accountable For Environmental Effects,
House Panel Told, 11 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 331 (1988); Rich, Conservation Woes at the
World Bank, NATioN,Jan. 23, 1989, at 88-90; Henwood, A Banker's World, NAnON, Oct.
30, 1989, at 481; Foreign Operations, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 238-69 (Treasury Report on
the Progress on Implementation of Environmental Reforms in the Multilateral Devel-
opment Banks).
149. Incorporating environmental concerns in debt relief should be less of a prob-
lem. The function of the Bank would be to coordinate debt relief negotiations
among debtor nations and multiple creditors. Environmental review would be car-
ried out independently by environmental groups wishing to engage in debt-for-
nature or debt-for-sustainable-development swaps.
150. Each of these forms has been proposed to Congress. Several of the proposals
are contained in New Directions For Dealing With The International Debt Problem: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988) [hereinafter New
Directions].
151. See J. ROBINSON, A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR LDC DEBT AND WORLD
TRADE GROWTH (1988).
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nations would have to provide substantial financial contributions.1 52
The U.S. and other developed nations, recognizing their interests in
resolving the debt crisis and promoting development and environmental
protections, should pursue the development of an international debt
management facility.15 3
The primary objective of the new institution would be to facilitate
repayment of loans while granting debtor nations the freedom to pursue
economic development. The institution would accomplish this by
rescheduling debt payments and restructuring the terms of repayment.
Debt-for-sustainable-development swaps are seemingly inconsistent
with this goal since they essentially involve a charitable donation of debt
in return for sustainable development programs, with no direct return
to the institution. To the extent that the institution is charged with pro-
moting development, however, debt-for-sustainable-development swaps
would be an important component of a debt relief plan offered to a
debtor nation. The economic gains realized by a debtor nation through
debt-for-sustainable-development swaps154 would potentially increase
that nation's ability to repay other debt obligations held by the institu-
tion. Even if the institution were not empowered to engage in debt
swaps, it could aid in their realization by including interested environ-
mental groups in debt renegotiations with developing countries, thereby
152. James D. Robinson III, a leading proponent of a debt management facility,
estimates that approximately $12.5 billion would be needed to fund the facility, with
perhaps 10% of that amount paid up front and the rest callable if needed. He
assumes that the U.S. would take a 20% share in the facility (the minimum for
obtaining veto rights) and that Japan would be willing to take a larger share. New
Directions, supra note 150, at 16.
At the behest of Congress, the U.S. Treasury conducted a study of the feasibility of
using the IMF's gold holdings or the World Bank's liquid resources to fund an inter-
national debt management facility. The Treasury concluded that neither proposal
would likely gain sufficient support from member nations of the IMF or World Bank.
Third World Debt-Reports and The Brady Plan: Hearings before the Subcomm. on International
Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 94 (1988).
153. Critics of the proposed facility have raised several objections. Foremost
among them is the substantial cost of funding the facility. Additionally, critics con-
tend that the socialization of risk created by concentrating debt in one public facility
runs counter to market practice. Banks would be relieved of investment risks, yet
receive little incentive to extend new loans to debtor nations. WORLD BANK, supra
note 48, vol. I, at xxxii. The U.S. Treasury has objected to the creation of a debt
management facility on these and other grounds. DEBT-EQurrY SwAps: How TO TAP
AN EMERGING MARKET 157 (1987).
Proponents of the facility respond that the plan would not be a bank "bail-out."
The banks would suffer a loss on the sale of discounted debt, thus sharing the burden
of providing debt relief. Moreover, the current practice whereby multilateral devel-
opment banks extend new loans to deeply indebted countries is in many respects a
bailout. The MDBs provide the debtor country with funds to repay the commercial
banks, and the risk of repayment is shifted to the new MDB loans. See Foreign Opera-
lions, supra note 2, pt. 5, at 87.
154. The economic benefits to the debtor nation include the cancellation of inter-
est payments which the nation would have had to pay had the debt not been
exchanged, and the revenues and savings from increased agricultural production,
poverty reduction, and resource conservation.
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making debt-for-sustainable-development swaps part of the overall
package.
A comprehensive debt relief plan incorporating debt exchanges,
debt rescheduling, and supplementary loans could substantially reduce
the burden on debtor nations of repaying their debt, while promoting
growth and conservation. By easing the debt burden, promoting sus-
tainable development, and reducing the exposure of commercial institu-
tions the program might to some extent encourage new investment in
the developing nations.
D. The U.S. Role in Promoting Debt Relief and Sustainable
Development
Ironically, while legislating a strong environmental and developmental
mandate, the U.S. has strongly resisted increasing external environmen-
tal spending for a number of political as well as economic reasons. For
example, the U.S. was the sole member at the United Nations General
Assembly to reject a recent proposal by the Soviet Union for multilateral
cuts in military spending in order to fund international environmental
protections. 155 The U.S. has also hampered Japanese efforts to increase
its funding of the World Bank for environmental programs to avoid
increasing Japan's influence in the bank. 15 6
While espousing a concern for the environment, the U.S. has been
slow to seize upon or seriously consider creative means of protecting it.
Given that the U.S. has substantially damaged its own environment and
has been a significant contributor to global environmental hazards, its
attempts to shape global environmental policy through rhetoric have
been offensive to many nations, including Brazil.1 57 The U.S. must rec-
ognize the debt it owes to the environment as well as to other nations
and take charge in seeking and funding solutions. The current debt cri-
sis may offer one means of protecting the global environment. The U.S.
can contribute to these solutions through means such as the creation of
an international debt relief institution, which would offer not only envi-
ronmental returns, but also potential economic returns upon the even-
tual revitalization of the Third World.
155. Poverty's Threat: Sustainable Development Offers Hope, U.N. MONTHLY CHRON.,
Mar. 1988, at 37.
Similarly, the U.S. was the sole U.N. member to reject a proposed action by the
General Assembly calling on industrial nations to increase funding to help resolve
the debt crisis. The U.S. felt that the action "did not recognize properly the role
debtor countries must play in solving the problems of their own debt." Developing
Countries Owe More Than $1,000 Billion: Solutions Must Be Urgently Sought, U.N. MONTHLY
CHRON., Mar. 1988, at 44.
156. Sancton, Hands Across The Sea, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 63.
157. Former Brazilian President Jose Sarney stated that the United States'
attempts to impose rain forest protections are "a messy interference" since the U.S.
has fouled its own environment. Rowen, supra note 7, at H10. Additionally, Brazil's
Interior Minister, Jo~o Alves, said that "[t]he big aggressors on the world environ-
ment are the industrial nations, which have given us acid rain, most of the green-
house effect, and depletion of the ozone layer." Work & Smith, supra note 80, at 49.
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Conclusion
Debt-for-nature and debt-for-sustainable-development swaps will solve
neither the debt crisis nor the environmental crisis. They can, however,
be important components of a long-term plan addressing both
problems. The two swaps are complex transactions requiring accommo-
dation of a number of interests and recognition of several factors. First,
it must be recognized that the environmental crisis and the debt crisis
are substantially intertwined and that mutual solutions are possible and,
indeed, preferable. Furthermore, parties should realize that in terms of
economic incentives and often in terms of promoting conservation,
debt-for-sustainable-development swaps are preferable to pure debt-
for-conservation exchanges. A combined environmental and economic
accounting is a practical necessity for addressing current crises and pro-
viding for future development.
The current debt crisis offers a unique opportunity for international
cooperation to protect the rain forests and foster sustainable develop-
ment in Third World countries. To have a significant impact in develop-
ing countries, debt-for-nature and debt-for-development swaps must be
integrated with a comprehensive debt relief program. An international
institution for debt and development is needed to coordinate such pro-
grams. The U.S. should take charge in the development and funding of
this institution, both as a matter of sound foreign policy and as a matter
of international responsibility.
David Barrans

